Start Eavesdrop hard sex chat lines

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• April 9, 2014 AM "why all the legal wrangling with lavabit for their SSL keys?

With microsoft, the nsa even has an enormous advantage: Microsoft itself claims that it had to give important design information of the crypto libraries to the nsa for reviewing. So the nsa might know the windows sourcecode, but we do not, thereby the nsa has it very easy when they make exploits for microsoft crypto functions.

I see that one can (illegally) get parts of the windows 2000 sourcecode on piratebay Perhaps by looking at that, one can tell what the nsa key really is for. (Mohan B) In order to fix #64710 at this very late private\inet\mshtml\src\core\cdutil\genutil.cxx: // HACK HACK HACK.

• April 9, 2014 AM "If the US agencies knew of and exploited this bug, then why all the legal wrangling with lavabit for their SSL keys? If collected evidence has to be presented in court, the agency can show a legal means by which it was collected, without revealing the vulnerability or the illegal act of exploiting it against a US company.

Yet another guess - US agencies only exploit this vulnerability outside of the US (lavabit was in the US), while non-US spy agencies exploit this vulnerability within the US.

This allows attackers to eavesdrop communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users. Half a million sites are vulnerable, including my own. At this point, the probability is close to one that every target has had its private keys extracted by multiple intelligence agencies. EDITED TO ADD (4/10): I'm hearing that the CAs are completely clogged, trying to reissue so many new certificates.

Basically, an attacker can grab 64K of memory from a server. The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into Open SSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. And I'm not sure we have anything close to the infrastructure necessary to revoke half a million certificates.

Or maybe they wanted access even if lavabit updates Open SSL one day or modify whatever they use.

Last possibility: the group going after lavabit did not necessary knew about this even if other groups did.

ok, he did not work there at the time he wrote that code, but still a nice theory).

The same person has also written the prposal for this heartbeat extension (where he admits that it does not need a payload but still implemented it for "flexibility") And the NSA is not the only secret service that has ever tried to plant backdoors, so maybe they just did not know about it or the people, that wanted the lavabit data did not find that exploit in the heap of other stuff they had...

The attack leaves no trace, and can be done multiple times to grab a different random 64K of memory. Possible evidence that Heartbleed was exploited last year.